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Abstract: 
The article examines recent cases such as Stack v Dowden and Jones v Kernott in England and Wales where 
the courts have restated the principles of the common intention constructive trust over property used as 
the family home. Both cases deal with disputes between cohabiting unmarried couples over the family 
home after termination of their relationships. The courts held in those cases that the presumption is that 
equity follows the law. Where, for instance, the legal title is held by the cohabiting couple in joint names, 
they are presumed to be legal and equitable joint tenants sharing equally unless one party rebuts that 
presumption by establishing that either their common intention was to hold the property in different 
shares or the original intention of equal sharing had changed over time, leading to an ambulation of the 
trust (the ambulatory trust). A rebuttal of the presumption will thus focus on the context RIWKHFRXSOH·V
relationship over the period of cohabitation (time), which arguably provides a more nuanced approach. It 
HQDEOHVWKHSDUWLHV·relationship to be assessed from the time of acquisition of the property to the point of 
separation in order to ascertain their actual intentions. The focus of the article is on the way in which time 
and context of home-sharing by unmarried cohabitants are being construed by the English courts and, 
particularly, the assumptions being made about certain types of conduct. The article seeks to argue that 
the cases reveal how the law remains imbued with certain ideologies and therefore reinforces a particular 
type cohabiting relationship, i.e., one that mimics marriage. Women continue to be portrayed as 
¶ZLIHPRWKHULQQRFHQW· ZKR UHTXLUH WKH ODZ·V SURWHFWLRQ DJDLQVW PHQ The sociology of unmarried 
cohabitation may require more in-depth examination in order to determine whether these assumptions 
are, or remain, apposite to cohabitants. 
Article in FamPrac.ch ² 2016 issue. 
2 
 
Sharing Homes by Unmarried Cohabiting Couples in England and Wales: Rebutting 
Presumptions and Exceptional Conduct   
Simone Wong, Reader in Law, University of Kent, UK 
 
 I. Introduction 
 Stack v Dowden1 and Jones v Kernott2, the two decisions that are at the centre of this article, are 
recent additions to a long list of cases in England and Wales which deal with disputes after the separation 
of a unmarried, cohabiting couple over the beneficial ownership of the family home. Both these House of 
Lords/Supreme Court decisions provide a restatement of the principles of the common intention 
constructive trust, which will be discussed in more detail below. It was held that, when determining the 
beneficial ownership of a property which is used by a cohabiting couple as their shared family home, the 
presumption is that equity follows the law. This means that, where the property is in joint names, the 
couple are presumed to be legal and equitable joint tenants unless the claimant is able to rebut that 
presumption by establishing either a common intention to hold the property in different shares or that 
the trust is ¶ambulatory· in nature, i.e., one in which the SDUWLHV· original intention regarding their 
beneficial interests had changed over time. Likewise, the claimant in a case where the property is held in 
the defendant·s (the claimanW·s cohabiting ex-partner·s) sole name will have to prove that she was 
intended to have a beneficial interest in the property.  
The cases further affirm that the presumptions are likely to be rebutted only in exceptional cases 
and the court may take into consideration a wider range of factors than just financial contributions in 
ascertaining the FRXSOH·V common intention, which may be express, inferred or imputed. Stack and Jones 
therefore provide a set of rules that is seemingly more simple and straightforward. A more holistic 
approach is taken in the process of ascertaining and rebutting WKH SDUWLHV· LQWHQWLRQV ZLWK JUHDWHU
DWWHQWLRQ EHLQJ JLYHQ WR WKH ¶FRQWH[W· RI WKHir relationship over the period of cohabitation. This 
combination of time and context is supposed to provide a more nuanced approach which enables an 
assessment of the FRXSOH·s relationship from the time of acquisition to the point of separation, and even 
beyond, as in Jones, in order to ascertain their actual intentions. Yet, these judicial attempts at tinkering 
ZLWK WKH FRPPRQ LQWHQWLRQ FRQVWUXFWLYH WUXVWKDYHNHSW DFDGHPLFGHEDWH DOLYH DERXW WKH ODZ·V ODFNRI
clarity and coherence, particularly on points such as inferred and imputed intentions.3   
                                                     
1 [2007] 2 All ER 929 (HL). 
2 [2011] 3 WLR 1121 (SC) 
3 GARDNER/DAVIDSON, The future of Stack v Dowden, Law Quarterly Review 2011, 13; DIXON, Editor's 
notebook: the still not ended, never-ending story, Conveyancer 2012, 83; MEE, Jones v Kernott: inferring and 
imputing in Essex, ibid, 167; PAWLOWSKI, Imputed intention and joint ownership - a return to common sense: 
Jones v Kernott, ibid, 149. 
Article in FamPrac.ch ² 2016 issue. 
3 
 
 It is not the aim of the article to rehearse those arguments. Instead, the focus is on the way in 
which time and context of home-sharing by cohabitants are being construed by the English courts and, 
particularly, the assumptions that are being made about certain types of conduct for the purposes of 
rebutting the presumption and/or DVFHUWDLQLQJ WKH SDUWLHV· (different) intentions about equitable 
ownership of the family home. These judicial constructions appear to reflect a desire to mitigate the 
harshness of Lloyds Bank v Rosset4 and provide greater justice in these cases. The article, however, will 
argue that these constructions may be problematic in several ways. For instance, the cases show how the 
law remains imbued with certain ideologies and therefore seem to reinforce a particular type cohabiting 
relationship, i.e., ones that mimic marriage. There is further a continued portrayal of the female claimant 
DV¶ZLIHPRWKHULQQRFHQW·ZKRUHTXLUHVWKHODZ·VSURWHFWLRQDJDLQVWPHQZKRGRQRWIRUH[DPSOHSXOO
their weight during the relationship (Stack) or fail in their responsibilities towards their children by 
becoming absent fathers after separation (Jones). This brings into question the appositeness of the 
inferences drawn by judges from the FRXSOH·Vconduct over the course of cohabitation when seeking to 
determine whether such FRQGXFW LV VXIILFLHQWO\ ¶H[FHSWLRQDO· :KLOH WKHUH LV LQFUHDVLQJO\ JUHDWHU
sociological research being conducted with regard to cohabitants and their financial arrangements, the 
sociology of cohabitation may require more in-depth examination in order to better address the issue of 
exceptionality. 
 
 II. Background: Constructive Trusts and The Family Home 
 By way of brief background, the property of spouses and civil partners in England and Wales5 is 
treated as separate property belonging to the particular spouse or civil partner who is the legal owner. In 
the event of divorce and the dissolution of a civil partnership, the English courts have very wide 
discretionary powers to redistribute the assets of spouses and civil partners under the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973 and the Civil Partnership Act 2004 respectively. The financial orders that the English court may 
make include financial provision (e.g., lump sum or periodical payments) and property adjustment orders 
(e.g., a transfer or settlement of property belonging to one spouse to the other). The current position in 
England is that there is no formal legal recognition of cohabitation. This means that, upon the breakdown 
of cohabitation, cohabitants in England will have to look to other areas of the law, such as, contract, 
property and trusts, to deal with their financial and property matters.6 In the case of disputes over the 
ownership of the family home, an area of law that is frequently invoked by cohabitants is trusts law. While 
legal ownership of the family home might be held in either the sole name of one of the cohabitants or 
their joint names, there is the separate question of WKHFRXSOH·Vbeneficial interests in the property. It is 
possible for a sole legal owner to hold the property as trustee for himself and his partner beneficially. 
                                                     
4 [1991] 1 AC 107 (Rosset). 
5 For the purposes of the articleVXEVHTXHQWUHIHUHQFHWR¶(QJODQG·UHIHUVWRERWK(QJODQGDQG:DOHV 
6 In Scotland, cohabitants are provided some legal protection upon the termination of their relationship: see Family 
Law (Scotland) Act 2006, ss 25-29. 
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Equally, a couple who are joint legal owners might hold the property beneficially for themselves or even 
just one of them. There is further the related question of the sizes of the beneficial shares they hold in the 
property. 
 A key reason for disputes arising in these cases is the absence of any express declaration of trust 
by the cohabiting couple to state explicitly what their respective beneficial interests are in the family 
home. Consequently, when cohabitation terminates, a dispute may potentially arise between the couple as 
to who owns what in respect of the family home, especially when both may have made contributions, 
financial and non-financial, during the course of the relationship towards the property and the family. 
Where the family home is purchased in joint names, the couple are usually taken to be both beneficially 
entitled to the home. The matter, however, is less clear-cut in the case of sole legal ownership. The nature 
of the dispute therefore might be a claim to a beneficial share in the property (in sole legal ownerships 
cases) and/or the size of that interest (in both sole and joint legal ownership cases). In addition, given the 
lack of an express trust at the outset, cohabitants are often likely to argue that the beneficial interest is 
held under a common intention constructive trust.  
 Generally speaking, a constructive trust is a trust which is implied by law. The nature of the 
common intention constructive trust (CICT) will seem peculiar to many Continental lawyers. It is a 
constructive trust which the law implies exists on the ground that the parties formed some common 
intention to share the property. The landmark case that laid down the principles relating to a CICT is 
Rosset.7 In order to prove the family home is subject to a CICT, the claimant must establish that there is, 
firstly, the requisite common intention to share, whether express or inferred; and secondly, the claimant 
must have acted to his or her detriment in reliance on that common intention. Rosset has also been taken 
as authority for the principle that, in the absence of any express intention, an intention may only be 
inferred from direct financial contributions towards the purchase of the property. As a result, a claimant 
who fails to make any direct financial contributions towards the acquisition of the family home but rather 
makes indirect financial, and even substantial, contributions towards the household and family,8  will not 
satisfy the strict Rosset test and will come away empty-handed.   
 Consequently, there have been criticisms about the rigidity of the Rosset test. The Law 
Commission of England and Wales, for instance, noted that, whilst the legal principles are sufficiently 
coherent and flexible, the requirements for proving the existence of a CICT are nonetheless inadequate to 
deal with the informal way that couples typically deal with each other.9 English courts in subsequent cases 
such as Midland Bank v Cooke,10 Drake v Whipp,11 and Hammond v Mitchell 12  have tried to get around the 
                                                     
7 Rosset (Fn. 4). 
8 e.g., paying for household bills, food and clothing for the family, and/or non-financial contributions, such as, 
unpaid labour in the home and provision of childcare. 
9 Law Commission, Sharing Homes: A Discussion Paper (2002), paras 2.40 and 2.112. 
10 [1995] 4 All ER 562 (Cooke). 
11 [1996] 1 FLR 826 (Drake). 
Article in FamPrac.ch ² 2016 issue. 
5 
 
rigidity of the Rosset test by taking a more generous interpretation of indirect contributions, at least for the 
purposes of demonstrating detrimental reliance by the claimant and the quantification of his or her 
beneficial interest.  
  
 III. Stack and Jones: The Significance of Time and Context on Intention to Share 
 Stack and Jones tell the familiar tale of a cohabiting couple who purchase a property in joint names 
in order to set up home for themselves and their children but omit to make an express declaration of trust 
of their beneficial interests. In both cases, there was no dispute that the man and the woman held 
beneficial interests in the family home. The dispute was over the quantification of their respective shares. 
Ms Dowden, in Stack, sought to argue that the SDUWLHV· intention at the time of acquisition was that the 
beneficial shares would be in proportions different to a joint tenancy, i.e., that they did not hold equal 
shares to the property. Briefly, Ms Dowden had cohabited with her ex-partner, Mr Stack, for nearly 27 
years, during which time they had four children. Their first home was a property in Purves Road which 
was purchased by Ms Dowden in 1983 in her sole name for £30,000. Substantial improvements to the 
property were carried out by Mr Stack, which significantly increased its value. That property was 
subsequently sold for £90,000 and a property in Chatsworth Road was purchased in 1993 for £190,000 as 
their new family home. That purchase was financed by £67,000 from the sale proceeds of the Purves 
Road house, £58,000 from Ms Dowden·VVDYLQJVDQGDPRUWJDJHRILQMRLQWQDPHV, which was 
secured by one endowment policy in joint names and another in Ms Dowden·VVROHQDPH 
 It was clear that, during the relationship, Ms Dowden·Vfinancial and non-financial contributions 
towards the acquisition of the Chatsworth Road property and household expenses as well as the care of 
the family were significantly greater than Mr Stack·V7KHUHZDVIXUWKHUHYLGHQFHWKDWWKH\KDGkept their 
finances separate, having separate bank accounts and investments and savings. The couple separated in 
2002 and Mr Stack brought proceedings seeking an order for the sale of the property and equal division 
of the sale proceeds. Ms Dowden, on the other hand, claimed a 65:35 split in her favour. While Mr 
Stack·s claim was successful at first instance, both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords found in 
favour of Ms Dowden and held that she was entitled to a 65% share.  
 Jones was also a case involving cohabitants, Ms Jones and Mr Kernott, who purchased a property 
in Badger Hall Avenue in joint names in 1985. They lived together in that property as their family home 
with their two children. The purchase was funded by a 20% deposit of £6000 from Ms Jones and the 
balance from an endowment mortgage in joint names. Mr Kernott subsequently provided the funds and 
labour for constructing an extension to the property which increased its value by nearly 50%. While the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
12 [1991] 1 WLR 1127. However, cases like Hammond (ibid), Cooke (Fn. 10) and Drake (Fn. 11) indicate that, while 
indirect non-financial contributions will be taken into account in deciding whether there has been detrimental 
reliance, there must, at the very minimum, be some direct financial contribution towards the purchase of the 
property in order to get the CICT claim off the ground. 
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couple was cohabiting, Mr Kernott paid £100 per week to Ms Jones which she used together with her 
earnings to pay for the mortgage interest, the endowment premiums and all outgoings on the property 
and the household expenses. The relationship ended in 1993 and Mr Kernott moved out. At the time of 
separation, it was not disputed that the property was held by the parties beneficially in equal shares. The 
case was unusual in that WKHGLVSXWHGLGQRWDULVHXQWLOVRPH\HDUVDIWHUWKHFRXSOH·VVHSDUDWLRQ 
 After separating, the couple tried unsuccessfully to sell the Badger Hall Avenue property. They 
then surrendered the life insurance policy in joint names and divided the proceeds equally. Mr Kernott 
used his share to purchase a property on Stanley Road in his sole name.13 Over the next 14 years, he 
stopped contributing to the outgoings on the Badger Hall Avenue property including payment of the 
mortgage interest and endowment premiums. In 2006, Mr Kernott sought payment of a half share in the 
value of the Badger Hall Avenue property which prompted Ms Jones to make an application under s 14 
of the Trust of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 for a declaration that the beneficial interests 
in the property was held under a 90:10 split in her favour. Mr Kernott in turn served a notice on Ms Jones 
in 2008 to sever the joint tenancy so that they held their respective beneficial interests not as joint tenants 
but as tenants-in-common.14  
 Both parties conceded that, from the time of acquisition right up to their separation, the 
intention had been for the beneficial interests to be held in equal shares. Ms Jones, however, successfully 
argued that that common intention had changed over time, particularly post-separation when she 
undertook full responsibility for the ownership of the property. The unusual question that the court had 
to grapple with was whether a CICT could be ambulatory in nature whereby the couple·s original 
common intention regarding their respective beneficial shares in the property could evolve and change 
over the course of time. An ambulation of the CICT would then enable Ms Jones to acquire an enlarged 
share of 90% after the couple separated. 
 A couple of significant points emerge from the decisions of the House of Lords/Supreme Court 
in Stack and Jones. Firstly, a distinction was drawn by the law lords between a domestic and a commercial 
context, with the former raising the presumption that equity follows the law. This means that the 
equitable (beneficial) LQWHUHVWVZLOO UHIOHFW WKH OHJDO LQWHUHVWV LQ WKHSURSHUW\7KXV ¶>M@XVW DV WKH starting 
point of sole legal ownership is sole beneficial ownership, the starting point where there is joint legal 
RZQHUVKLS LV MRLQW EHQHILFLDO RZQHUVKLS·15 Secondly, the presumption of equitable joint tenancy is 
                                                     
13 Ms Jones had initially sought to claim a half share in the Stanley Road property but the claim was rejected by HHJ 
Dedman. She initially appealed against that finding but subsequently abandoned her claim. Mr Kernott instead 
sought to the appeal against the finding that he held only a 10% share in the Badger Hall Avenue property. 
14 Under English property law, the beneficial interests of two or more persons in property can be held by them 
either as joint tenants or tenants-in-common. One specific feature of joint tenancy is the application of the rule of 
survivorship, i.e., the interest of the deceased will vest automatically in the survivor. The right of survivorship does 
not apply to interests held under a tenancy-in-common, which provides each beneficial owner an undivided share in 
the property. A tenant-in-common is therefore entitled to deal with his or her undivided share as he or she wishes 
and may bequeath that share to a third party.   
15 Stack (Fn. 1), per Lady Hale at [56]. 
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rebuttable. However, according to Lady Hale, the presumption would only be rebutted in exceptional 
cases and the burden, which lies with the party seeking to rebut the presumption, is DKHDY\RQHDQG¶LV
QRWD WDVN WREH OLJKWO\HPEDUNHGXSRQ·16 Crucially, in Jones, the Supreme Court further added that the 
presumption may be rebutted by establishing a change of intention through an ambulatory trust, provided 
WKDW WKH SDUWLHV· LQWHUHVWV remain the same at any one point in time and they cannot intend to hold 
different interests concurrently.17 In other words, common intention is not immutable and may change 
thereby enabling a CICT to be ambulatory. TKH DPEXODWLRQ RI WKH WUXVW ZRXOG UHTXLUH ¶FRPSHOOLQJ
HYLGHQFH«EHIRUHRQHFDQLQIHUWKDWVXEVHTXHQWWRWKHDFTXLVLWLRQRIWKHKRPHWKHSDUWLHVLQWHQGHGa 
FKDQJHLQWKHVKDUHVLQZKLFKWKHEHQHILFLDORZQHUVKLSLVKHOG·18  
 Lady Hale further goes on to say in Stack WKDW¶FRQWH[WLVHYHU\WKLQJ·LQODZDQG¶>W@KHFRQWH[WLV
VXSSOLHG E\ WKH QDWXUH RI WKH SDUWLHV· FRQGXFW DQG DWWLWXGHV WRZDUGV WKHLU SURSHUW\ DQG ILQDQFHV·19 In 
Jones, Lord Walker and Lady Hale reiterate that there are at least two reasons for the presumption of 
equitable joint tenancy in cases where a couple, married or unmarried, purchase a family home in joint 
names. The first is that the joint SXUFKDVHLVDVWURQJLQGLFDWLRQRI¶HPRWLRQDODQGHFRQRPLFcommitment to 
a joint enterprise· (emphasis added).20 Secondly, couples do not adhere to a strict accounting of 
contributions made and are unlikely to undertake an arithmetic calculation of their respective 
contributions towards the purchase of the property, outgoings and household expenses during the 
relationship. Furthermore, there is the added practical difficulty of analysing respective contributions to 
the property over a long period.21 Lady Hale states that many factors other than financial contributions 
PD\EHUHOHYDQWLQDVFHUWDLQLQJWKHSDUWLHV·LQWHQWLRQVUHJDUGLQJEHQHILFLDORZQHUVKLSRIWKHIDPLO\KRPH
They include, for example: the reason for the acquisition of the property; the nature RI WKH SDUWLHV·
UHODWLRQVKLS ZKHWKHU WKH\ KDG FKLOGUHQ WKH SDUWLHV· ILQDQFLDO DUUDQJHPHQWV KRZ WKH SXUFKDVH RI WKH
property is financed, both initially and subsequently, and whether they undertook joint liability for the 
mortgage; the arrangements for meeting all outgoings on the property and household expenses; and the 
individual characters and personalities of the parties.22 This multi-factorial approach engages the court in 
an evaluation of WKHFRQWH[WRIHDFKFDVHDQGPRUHVSHFLILFDOO\WKHSDUWLHV·conduct for the purposes of 
ascertaining whether or not there was a commitment to a joint enterprise. In doing so, the judges ascribe 
meanings and FRQVWUXFWLRQVWRWKHFRXSOH·VFRQGXFW in order to determine whether the particular conduct 
is sufficiently exceptional to rebut the presumption of equitable joint tenancy, which we turn to below. 
 IV. Rebutting Presumptions and the Search for Exceptionality  
                                                     
16 Ibid, per Lady Hale at [68]. 
17 Ibid, per Lady Hale at [63] and [70]. 
18 Ibid, per Lord Neuberger at [138]. 
19 Ibid, per Lady Hale at [69] and [90]. 
20 Jones (Fn. 2) at [19]. 
21 Ibid at [22]. 
22 Stack (Fn. 1) at [69]. 
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 In order to rebut the presumption of equitable joint tenancy, both Ms Dowden and Ms Jones 
had to establish the exceptionality of their respective cases. This section looks at the types of conduct the 
courts took into account and, more importantly, the meanings they ascribed to such conduct, for the 
purposes of determining whether the case was indeed exceptional. In Stack, WKH FRXSOH·V ILQDQFLDO
arrangements significantly influenced WKHPDMRULW\·VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHFRQWH[WDQGZKHWKHUWKH FRXSOH·V 
conduct was sufficiently exceptional to rebut the presumption of equitable joint tenancy. Ms Dowden had 
undoubtedly contributed considerably more towards the acquisition of the property and all outgoings on 
the property than Mr Stack. Her total financial contribution towards the purchase price of the Chatsworth 
Road property was about £163,435 (i.e., £125,000 for the purchase price and £38,435 for the mortgage 
repayment) compared to Mr Stack·V £60,747 (i.e., £27,000 for the mortgage repayment and £33,747 for 
the joint endowment policy premiums).23 Ms Dowden also paid most of the utilities bills and all the 
premiums for the life policy in her sole name. The couple had kept their finances separate and took 
responsibility for specific items of household expenditure. These facts led the majority to hold that there 
was no pooling of resources by the couple for the common good. Consequently, the individualised financial 
arrangements adopted by Ms Dowden and Mr Stack made the FDVHH[FHSWLRQDOVLQFHLQ/DG\+DOH·VYLHZ
¶>W@KHUHFDQQRWEHPDQ\XQPDUULHGFRXSOHVZKRKDYHOLYHGWRJHWKHUDVORQJDVWKLVZKRKDGIRXUFKLOGUHQ
toJHWKHUDQGZKRVHDIIDLUVKDYHEHHQNHSWDVULJLGO\VHSDUDWHDVWKLVFRXSOH·VDIIDLUVZHUHNHSW·24  
 Lord Neuberger, who dissented from the majority as to reasoning, took a different tack on the 
exceptionality issue.  While his Lordship agreed with the majority that the presumption of equal sharing 
could only be rebutted in exceptional cases,25 there were differences in opinion about the types of 
conduct that would be sufficient for a rebuttal. Lord Neuberger, for instance, acknowledges that couples 
may not always intend to share their assets equally, even in a long-term close and loving relationship, and 
accepts the view of the majority regarding the reduced importance of arithmetical calculation of the 
SDUWLHV· UHVSHFWLYH FRQWULEXWLRQV ZLWKLQ D GRPHVWLF FRQtext. Thus, repayments of capital per se, even if 
wholly made by one party, may not necessarily lead to an inference of an intention that the beneficial 
interests should be adjusted.26 However, he takes a narrower approach than the majority to the question 
of ZKHWKHU WKHUH LVVXIILFLHQWO\ ¶FRPSHOOLQJHYLGHQFH· WRUHEXW WKHSUHVXPSWLRQMore particularly, he is 
reluctant to assume an intention of equal sharing purely on the basis that the parties have shared or 
pooled resources, especially where the family home had been acquired by significantly different 
contributions.27 According to Lord Neuberger, the types of conduct that might justify an inference of an 
intention to share other than equally include, for example: substantial improvements to the property (and 
not just decoration or repairs even if substantial) which add to the capital value of the property; 
                                                     
23 This in fact works out nearly to a 65:35 split in contribution. 
24 Stack (Fn 1) at [92]. 
25 Ibid at [138]. 
26 Ibid at [132] and [140]. 
27 Ibid at [133], [141] and [146]. 
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repayments of capital; and possibly interest payments.28 These types of contributions may typically be 
classified as contributions, whether direct or indirect, towards the acquisition of the property and reflect 
/RUG1HXEHUJHU·V general preference for using the resulting trust analysis for rebuttal purposes. Thus, for 
him LW LV0V'RZGHQ·VVLJQLILFDQWO\JUHDWHUGLUHFWILQDQFLDOFRQWULEXWLRQVWRZDUGVWKHDFTuisition of the 
family home rather than the broader relationship and personality factors that justify an adjustment of the 
FRXSOH·VEHQHILFLDOLQWHUHVWV 
 Jones, on the other hand, dealt with the extent to which post-acquisition (more specifically, post-
sHSDUDWLRQFRQGXFWPD\DOWHUWKHSDUWLHV· LQWHQWLRQV,QRWKHU words, the presumption of equitable joint 
tenancy may be rebutted by establishing an ambulatory constructive trust. The question then is whether 
the SDUWLHV· post-separation conduct with regard to the Badger Hall Avenue property, where Ms Jones had 
substantially undertaken full responsibility for all the outgoings of the property and Mr Kernott had 
become increasingly detached from it, can be seen as sufficiently exceptional to rebut the presumption of 
equal sharing. Unlike in Stack, the pooling of resources during the relationship would lend support to the 
YLHZWKDWWKHFRXSOH·V commitment to a joint enterprise and that their initial intention had been to hold 
the property in equal shares. However, the very separate financial arrangements of the couple post-
separation were equally, if not more, exceptional than in Stack WKDW WKHUH ZDV ¶DQ HYHQ PRUH PDUNHG
degree [of separation of finances] than the unmarried couple in Stack v Dowden·29 from which a change of 
intention might be inferred or imputed. Ms Jones, like Ms Dowden, had contributed financially a larger 
proportion. Aside from paying for all other outgoings on the property, household expenses and 
PDLQWHQDQFHRI WKHFRXSOH·V FKLOGUHQ since 1993, she contributed the 20% deposit and a preponderant 
FRQWULEXWLRQ RI  RI WKH PRUWJDJH LQWHUHVW DQG HQGRZPHQW SUHPLXPV 0U.HUQRWW·V FRQWULEXWLRQ
was limited to the capital value added to the property (roughly 33%) and payments of the mortgage 
interest and endowment premiums between 1985 and 1993 (about 18.5% of those payments). The Court 
of Appeal, on the other hand, took a very different view. As Wall LJ explains:30  
There has to be something to displace those interests, and I have come to the conclusion that the 
passage of time is insufficient to do so, even if, in the meantime, the appellant has acquired 
alternative accommodation, and the respondent has paid all the outgoings.  
 The majority in the Court of Appeal then proceeded to find that there was insufficient evidence 
IURP WKH FRXSOH·VSRVW-separation conduct to enable the judge to infer the existence of an ambulatory 
WUXVWDQGWKDWWKHSDUWLHV·RULJLQDOLQWHQWLRQKDGFKDQJHG+RZHYHULQDOORZLQJ0V-RQHV·DSSHDOWRWKH
Supreme Court, Lord Walker and Lady Hale, who delivered a joint judgment, found that the significant 
FKDQJHV LQ WKH FRXSOH·V SRVW-separation financial arrangements (i.e., keeping their finances completely 
separate and the cessation of the pooling of resources) were treated as being sufficiently exceptional to 
                                                     
28 Ibid at [139]. 
29 [2010] 1 All ER 947 (HC), per  Nicholas Strauss QC at [47]. 
30 [2010] 3 All ER 423 (CA) at [58]. 
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rebut the initial intention of equal sharing. Within the context-based relational approach taken by the 
House of Lords/Supreme Court, the FRXSOHV·lack of pooling of resources was seen as a significant factor. 
 The upshot is that an equal sharing intention arises in a joint names case only when WKHFRXSOH·V
¶HPRWLRQDO DQG HFRQRPLF FRPPLWPHQW WR D MRLQW HQWHUSULVH· evidences, in Gardner·s view, a materially 
communal relationship where there is a pooling of all material resources such as money, assets and 
labour.31 The commitment of spouses and civil partners, on the other hand, are subject to less scrutiny 
since their relationships are ordinarily regarded as being materially communal regardless of the nature and 
scale of their respective contributions to the family economy.32 Gardner, for instance, points to Drake33 as 
a case in point where the couple had generally kept their finances separate, only pooling together on 
certain things such as the acquisition and improvement of the family home. Given the non-materially 
communal relationship, their beneficial shares reflected their respective financial contributions towards 
the acquisition of the property. By contrast, the fact that the couple in Cooke34 were married lent itself to 
the relationship being deemed as materially communal and that the spouses intended to share equally 
despite their significantly unequal contributions towards the purchase of the property. Cohabitants who 
wish to benefit from the presumption of equal sharing are thus required (and expected) to demonstrate 
their commitment by behaving like married couples and operating as a single economic unit since 
anything less will not do! Cohabitants whose behaviour deviates from this normative view of (marital) 
couple relationships are more likely to succeed in demonstrating the exceptionality of the case and 
rebutting the presumption of equal sharing. There remain, however, the questions of whether the 
marriage model should be applied to cohabitation and, more importantly, whether judicial views on the 
way committed couples, married and unmarried, conduct, or ought to conduct, themselves are 
appropriate to modern day relationships. 
 
 V. Deciphering Context and Conduct in Intimate Couple Relationships 
 The emphasis placed on context in Stack and Jones enables a more fact-sensitive analysis of the 
SDUWLHV·GHDOLQJVDQGPRUHLPSRUWDQWO\, a shift away from direct financial contributions to a wider range 
of financial and non-financial contributions to ground a CICT claim. Such a move is significant in terms 
of acknowledging the existence of economic inequalities within couple relationships as a result of a 
gendered division of labour. However, the cases have received mixed reception from academic 
                                                     
31 GARDNER, Family Property Today, Law Quarterly Review 2008, 422. Cf. a non-materially communal relationship 
extends to those where there is partial pooling of material resources such as joint purchase of certain items (e.g. 
groceries and purchase of a car) rather than a pooling of material resources across the board.   
32 Ibid at 432.  
33 Drake (Fn. 11). 
34 Cooke (Fn. 10). 
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commentators. Some have questioned the legal effect given by the courts to context35 while others are 
concerned with the lack of doctrinal clarity and coherence.36 Some note that Stack and Jones illustrate the 
increasing familialisation of trusts law in the case of the family home.37 This is reflected, for instance, in 
the factors listed in para 69 by Lady Hale in Stack being similar to those considered in family law. In doing 
so, the approach now being taken in disputes over the family home is more nuanced and enables the 
courts to consider a cRXSOH·Vinterpersonal relationship. The familialisation of property law has further led 
to a shift from the principle of separate property to a notion of equal sharing of family assets by (married) 
couples. Similarly, the familialisation of the trusts regime, HAYWARD argues, enables a more family-
centric approach to be taken in disputes between couples over jointly owned property.38 This may also 
PLWLJDWHWKH¶UHODWLRQVKLSEOLQGQHVV·RIRosset.39  The presumption of equitable joint tenancy is symbolic of 
this familialisation process and that only exceptional circumstances will rebut that presumption. 
 The disparate weight given by the courts in Stack and Jones WRWKHIDFWRUVVXUURXQGLQJWKHSDUWLHV·
relationship before and after separation nonetheless flags up the problem that judges face in construing 
WKHFRQWH[WRIWKHSDUWLHV·UHODWLRQVKLS. They have to attach meanings to the ways in which the couples 
behave and conduct their interpersonal dealings as a means to determining their commitment and, 
relatedly, a common intention to share equally. As discussed above, the familialisation of trusts law has 
meant that the focus on context has led to ¶conduct· performing an evidentiary role of filtering out the 
deserving (committed) from the less or non-deserving (non-committed) cohabiting relationships, with 
FRKDELWDQWV· FRQGXFW EHLQJ PHDVXUHG DJDLQVW WKH PDUULDJH PRGHO Here, GARDNER·V FDWHJRULVDWLRQ RI
materially and non-materially communal relationships provides a useful reminder of the narrow 
construction that judJHV KDYH JLYHQ WR WKH FRQWH[W RI FRXSOHV· UHODWLRQVKLSV 7KH DOORFDWLRQ RI
responsibility for certain items of capital and household expenditure between Ms Dowden and Mr Stack, 
for instance, is D VWDUN UHPLQGHU RI WKH MXGJHV· SUHRFFXSDWLRQ ZLWK MRLQW SRROLng of resources as a 
significant indicator of commitment.  
 The prioritisation of joint pooling of resources further reflects the way in which the law remains 
imbued by certain ideologies which, in this case, is the traditional family model of male 
breadwinner/female homemaker. The judges are, accordingly, adopting a particular notion of 
commitment. In doing so, they make certain assumptions about the way(s) that married couples behave as 
a result of their commitment and extend those assumptions to cohabitants. In these cases, cohabiting 
                                                     
35 See, e.g., HOPKINS, The Relevance of Context in Property Law: A Case for Judicial Restraint?, Legal Studies 2011, 
175 
36 DIXON (Fn. 3); MEE (Fn. 3).  
37 HAYWARD, "Family property" and the process of "familialisation" of property law, Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 2012, 284, ZKREXLOGVRQ'HZDU·VRULJLQDOWKHVLVRIWKHIamilialisation of property law in DEWAR, Land 
Law, and the Family Home, in BRIGHT/DEWAR (eds), Land Law: Themes and Perspectives, Oxford 1998, 327-355; 
COOKE, Community of Property, Joint Ownership and the Family Home, in DIXON/GRIFFITHS (eds), 
Contemporary Perspectives on Property, Equity and Trusts Law, Oxford 2007, 39-55. 
38 HAYWARD (Fn. 37) at 296. 
39 BOTTOMLEY, Women and Trust(s): Portraying the Family in the Gallery of Law, in BRIGHT/DEWAR (Fn. 36), 
206-228.  
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relationships that mimic marriage are able to benefit from the way in which marriage forms a symbolic 
signal of commitment.40 In other words, the familialisation of trusts law leads to the application of the 
logic of semblance where protection is extended from marriage to other groups (e.g., cohabitants) on the 
basis of patterns of sameness or similarity.41 This approach, however, raises two further and interrelated 
questions. The first is whether or not married couples and cohabitants hold different notions of 
commitment and, secondly, whether the judicial assumptions about the ways in which committed 
couples, whether married or unmarried, structure their relationships including financial arrangements and 
their willingness to share resources are accurate.   
 
 Notions of commitment 
 As cohabiting relationships tend to be more fragile than marriage,42 there is a general perception 
that cohabitants are less committed than married couples. SMART and STEVENS· UHVHDUFK IRXQG WKDW
cohabLWDQWV·FRPPLWPHQWIDOODORQJDFRQWLQXXPWKDWUDQJHVIURPPXWXDOWRFRQWLQJHQW43  This seems to 
then set their notion of commitment apart from VSRXVHV·ZLWKPXWXDOO\FRPPLWWHGUHODWLRQVKLSVEHLQJ
the closest proximate of marriage. Yet, SMART observes that relationships based on contingent 
commitment do not necessarily lack commitment.44 That being the case, there is the question of whether 
spouses and cohabitants have similar or different notions of commitment and what bearing that would 
have, if any, on the way in which their relationships are structured.  
 Social psychologists have found that the notion of commitment is three-dimensional, comprising: 
commitment to partner (wanting to stay with a particular partner); commitment to relationship (feeling 
morally bound to stay in and maintain the relationship); and feelings of entrapment (feeling trapped in the 
                                                     
40 ROWTHORN, Marriage as a signal, in DNES/ROWTHORN (eds), The Law and Economics of Marriage & Divorce, 
Cambridge 2002, 132-156.  
41 See BOTTOMLEY/WONG, Shared Households: A New Paradigm for Thinking about the Reform of Domestic 
Property Relations, in DIDUCK2·DONOVAN (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Family Law, Abingdon 2006, 39-57. 
42 The fragility of cohabitations is usually based on the duration of those relationships, which tend to be shorter than 
marriages. Yet, there is evidence that cohabitation is gradually increasing in duration. In the United Kingdom, the 
average length of cohabitation increased from 6.5 years in 2000 to 6.9 years in 2006. Parenting cohabitations have 
also increased to 8.5 years by 2006. See BARLOW/BURGOYNE/CLERY/SMITHSON, Cohabitation and the law: myths, 
money and the media, in PARK/CURTICE/THOMSON/PHILLIPS/JOHNSON/CLERY (eds), British Social Attitudes: 
The 24th Report, London 2008, 29, 33.  
43 SMART/STEVENS, Cohabitation Breakdown, Family and Parenthood Policy and Practice (Family Policy Studies 
Centre, 2000).  
44 SMART, Stories of Family Life: Cohabitation, Marriage and Social Change, Canadian Journal of Family Law 2000, 
20. Here, Smart classifies the mutually committed and contingently committed relationships as being reflexive and 
risky ones respectively. A reflexive relationship means one where the couple have put some thought into their 
relationship and have made plans including planning for children, making legal and financial agreements and 
formulating mutually agreed expectations of the relationship; cf risk relationship where the couple act by chance or 
spontaneously when faced with significant life events. Smart, however, stresses (at 36) that the latter is not 
necessarily commitment-free but rather one where the couple hope things work out somehow and actual 
expectations are either left unsaid or minimal.  
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relationship).45 ¶&RPPLWPHQWWRSDUWQHU· LVPRUHSUHVHQW-RULHQWHGZKLOH ¶FRPPLWPHQWWRUHODWLRQVKLS· LV
future-oriented. Both dimensions evince more posLWLYHIHHOLQJVDERXWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK¶FRPPLWPHQW
WRUHODWLRQVKLS·EHLQJSDUWLFXODUO\VDOLHQWWRWKHORQJ-term stability of the relationship.46 'HVSLWH¶IHHOLQJV
RIHQWUDSPHQW·SRUWUD\LQJPRUHQHJDWLYHIHHOLQJVWRZDUGVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSWKis may be duHWRWKHFRXSOH·V
disparate levels of education and earnings, the quality of the relationship and/or a sense of dissatisfaction. 
A high level of any one of these three dimensions of commitment may lead to a comparatively high level 
of commitment.47  
 The public declaration made by spouses during the wedding ceremony per se suffices to indicate 
their commitment, with commitment to partner and/or marriage being the idealised norms rather than 
feelings of entrapment. However, what is less obvious is the level of that commitment, which may vary 
between married couples but is nonetheless uniformly assumed to exist. The point is that the existence 
and the level of commitment are both taken for granted in a marital relationship. It is further assumed 
that, due to the greater fragility of cohabitation, the quality of FRKDELWDQWV· commitment as well as their 
SHUFHSWLRQRIFRPPLWPHQWPD\EHTXDOLWDWLYHO\GLIIHUHQWIURP LIQRW LQIHULRUWRVSRXVHV·As has been 
argued elsewhere,48 the willingness of the law to provide protection to cohabitants is then governed by 
the degree to which a cohabiting couple exhibits the type of commitment equivalent to that of spouses. 
The familialisation of trusts law has meant that the courts are searching for evidence that a cohabiting 
coupOH·V FRPPLWPHQW LV VLPLODU RU FRPSDUDEOH WR PDULWDO FRPPLWPHQW LQRUGHU IRU D SUHVXPSWLRQ RI
equal sharing to apply. That commitment should in turn translate into the cohabiting couple behaving in 
patterns similar to a married couple. 
 While only small-scale research on cohabitants has been conducted to date in the UK, the 
findings reveal that there is little difference between spouses and cohabitants in terms of their notion of 
commitment. LEWIS found that the three-dimensional notion of commitment was equally applicable to 
cohabitants.49 She further found that it was not the notion of commitment that varied significantly 
between spouses and cohabitants but their mode of expression of that commitment. Couples who choose 
marriage are clearly willing to express their commitment in a more public and overt way, compared to 
cohabitants who generally prefer a more private expression of their commitment. A tentative conclusion 
that may be drawn from the limited research findings is that cohabitants and spouses do not differ 
significantly in terms of their notions of commitment. Even then, an analysis of commitment only tells a 
partial story. The more central concern in disputes over the family home is the effect that commitment 
has on the way in which couples, married and unmarried, might structure their relationship and day-to-
                                                     
45 DRIGOTAS/RUSBULT/VERETTE, Level of commitment, mutuality of commitment, and couple well-being, 
Personal Relationships 1999, 389. 
46 ADAMS/JONES, The Conceptualization of Marital Commitment: An Integrative Analysis, Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 1997, 1177. 
47 DRIGOTAS/RUSBULT/VERETTE (Fn. 45). 
48 WONG, Shared commitment, interdependency and property relations: a socio-legal project for cohabitation, Child 
and Family Law Quarterly 2012, 60. 
49 LEWIS, The End of Marriage?, London 2001, at 125. 
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day arrangements since this enquiry feeds into the issue of interpretation of context. The imbuement of 
WKH ODZZLWK LGHRORJLHV VXFKDV WKH WUDGLWLRQDO ¶PDOHEUHDGZLQQHUIHPDOHKRPHPDNHU·QRWion of family 
affects judicial constructions of interdependency in that it can skew the meanings that judges ascribe to 
the parties· conduct.   
 
 Interdependence and the structure of relationships 
 Research findings have found a correlation between a partnHU·V FRPPLWPHQW DQG WKH FRXSOH·V
level of interdependence.50 Given that relationships are influenced by various factors including 
institutionalised roles and cultural norms, the concept of interdependence is neither static nor one-
dimensional. Dependence encompasses four dimensions: the basis of dependence; the degree of 
dependence; WKH PDWFKLQJ RI WKH SDUWQHUV· UHVSHFWLYH JRDOV; and whether dependence is mutual 
(interdependence) or unilateral.51 A significance of the correlation as well as multi-dimensionality of 
FRPPLWPHQWDQGLQWHUGHSHQGHQFHLVWKDWWKH\VKDSHDQGLQIOXHQFHWKHFRXSOH·VLQWHUDFWLRQDQGGHJUHHRI
interdependence. In addition, affect also has an effect on the way that couples structure their relationship. 
As PEPLAU observes ¶$IIHFW«LQIOXHQFHVEHKDYLRXUDOSDWWHUQV LQWKDWWKHUROHVWKDWSHRSOHXQGHUWDNH
ZLWKLQDUHODWLRQVKLSDUHLQIOXHQFHGE\RQH·VHPRWLRQDOLQYHVWPHQWLQDUHODWLRQVKLS·52 Research findings 
on the psychological perceptions of commitment and (inter)dependence therefore indicate their effect on 
the way and extent to which couples embark on accommodative behaviour in an effort to maintain the 
relationship.53 Higher levels of commitment directly influence each partner·V willingness to make 
sacrifices for the good of both the dyad and the relationship.54 There is further the latent correlation 
between (inter)dependency and power, i.e., WKDW RQH SDUWQHU·V GHSHQGHQFH RQ WKH RWKHU LV URXJKO\
HTXLYDOHQWWRWKHODWWHU·VOHYHORISRZHURYHUWKHIRUPHU7KXV, the greater RQHSDUWQHU·V dependence on 
the other, the greater the ODWWHU·Vpower in that relationship. Not all relationships are likely to be perfectly 
balanced relationships of interdependency. It is more likely that one partner may be more dependent on 
the other, whether emotionally or economically, in which case the power dynamics will be skewed in 
favour of the latter.   
 Within the family home context, we cRQVLGHU WZR SDUWLFXODU VWUXFWXUDO DVSHFWV RI FRKDELWDQWV·
interdependence: the first is the (gendered) division of labour and the other, their financial arrangements, 
                                                     
50 Here, interdependence may be understood as consisting of two aspects: the first is the level RI HDFKSDUWQHU·V
dependence on the other for the achievement of good outcomes; and the other is the mutuality of their dependence 
i.e. the extent to which they are similarly dependent on each other to achieve those outcomes. 
51 BLUMSTEIN/KOLLOCK, Personal Relationships, Annual Review of Sociology 1988, 467; RUSBULT/VAN LANGE, 
Interdependence, Interaction, and Relationships, Annual Review of Psychology 2003, 351 
52 PEPLAU, Roles and Gender, in KELLEY et al (eds), Close Relationships, New York 1983, 220-264, at 228. 
53 BERSCHEID, Interpersonal Relationships, Annual Review of Psychology 1994, 79; TRAN/SIMPSON, 
Prorelationship Maintenance Behaviors: The Joint Roles of Attachment and Commitment, Journal of Personal and 
Social Psychology 2009, 685. 
54 POWELL/VAN VUGT, Genuine Giving or Selfish Sacrifice? The Role of Commitment and Cost Level upon 
Willingness to Sacrifice?, European Journal of Social Psychology 2003, 403 
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e.g., management and control of money and perceptions of ownership of money especially when one 
partner either is the sole earner or earns significantly more than the other. The way in which the majority 
LQWKH+RXVHRI/RUGV6XSUHPH&RXUWKDGUHVSRQGHGWRWKHQDUUDWLYHVRIWKHIHPDOHFODLPDQWV·OLYHVLQ
Stack and Jones demonstrates an inclination towards a gendered construction of WKHSDUWLHV·conduct. The 
judges were not only ascribing mHDQLQJV WR WKH SDUWLHV· FRQGXFW LQ WHUPV RI how committed (marital) 
couples behave (or at least expected to behave) but also in a gendered way.  The substantial provision of 
caregiving contributions by Ms Dowden and Ms Jones were seen as being the norm and to be expected of 
WKHLU UROHV DV ¶ZLYHV· DQG ¶PRWKHUV·.55 When provided by women, these types of contributions are 
normalised by the courts as being provided out of natural love and affection.56 Thus, the ordinary 
provision of such contributions by a woman as mother is not exceptional. While it is not completely clear 
from Stack or Jones whether non-financial contributions alone would be sufficient to ground a claim to a 
EHQHILFLDO LQWHUHVWXQGHUDFRPPRQLQWHQWLRQFRQVWUXFWLYHWUXVW WKH LPDJHU\RIWKH ¶JRRGZLIHPRWKHU·
within a familialised framework is nonetheless a powerful one and FDQKHOSWREROVWHUDZRPDQ·VFODLP
that the relationship was a joint enterprise and, relatedly, her just desert is to have at least an equal, if not 
greater, share in the family home.  
 Conversely, the traditional family form reinforces the role of the man as the main, if not sole, 
wage-earner, thus requiring him to demonstrate his efficient performance of the role of good provider by 
making adequate provision to the household income. In Stack, for instance, Lady Hale even hinted at Mr 
6WDFN·V ORZHU ILQDQFLDO FRQWULEXWLRQV WRZDUGV WKH SXUFKDVH RI WKH IDPLO\ KRPH DV ZHOO DV WKH IDPLO\
economy as evidence of his lack of commitment:57 
Had it been clear that he had undertaken to pay for consumable and child minding, it might have 
been possible to deduce some sort of commitment WKDWHDFKZRXOGGRZKDWWKH\FRXOG%XW0U6WDFN·V
evidence did not even go as far as that. (emphasis added) 
This statement might be unpacked to indicate an acceptance of the gendered division of labour within a 
heterosexual couple relationship. The man therefore is not expected to actually perform the task of child-
PLQGLQJDVWKLVLVVHHPLQJO\ZRPHQ·VZRUNDV(expected) financial provider, he might be able to relieve 
himself of personal responsibility for performing those types of tasks as long as he performs the 
normative role of breadwinner and is able to pay someone else to do the job. /LNHZLVH0U.HUQRWW·V
detachment from not just the property but also his children, particularly his failure to contribute 
financially both towards the property and the maintenance of his children, was seen as somewhat reckless 
(being an absent father) and deviant to the role of male breadwinner. 7KXV0U6WDFN·VDQG0U.HUQRWW·V
                                                     
55 Interestingly, research indicates that women who earn significantly more than their male partners (e.g. Ms 
Dowden) may still perform a larger portion of the housework due to the gender display approach to the division of 
labour. Gender expectations, or deviance from gender norms of male breadwinning, may lead to women performing 
a larger share of the housework: see BITTMAN et al, When Does Gender Trump Money? Bargaining and Time in 
Household Work, The American Journal of Sociology 2003, 186. 
56 LAWSON, The things we do for love: detrimental reliance in the family home, Legal Studies 1996, 218; WONG, 
Would You "Care" to Share Your Home?, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 2007, 268. 
57 Stack (Fn. 1) at [91]. 
Article in FamPrac.ch ² 2016 issue. 
16 
 
conduct were construed by the courts as being exceptional since their conduct were seemingly an 
abdication of their masculine responsibilities as main breadwinners.  
 The construction of the FRXSOHV· UHVSHFWLYH ILQDQFLDO DUUDQJHPHQWVZas also influenced by this 
normative view of family life. Here, the presumption made is that spouses, as a committed couple, 
operate as a single economic unit.  Cohabitants wishing to benefit from this familialised framework of 
trusts law are expected to act like spouses and, accordingly, operate as a single economic unit. Yet, it is 
questionable whether these perceptions are not only relevant to but also an accurate reflection of how 
couples, married and unmarried, manage their finances. Earlier research indicates that the financial 
arrangement of married and unmarried couples tend to follow one of four typologies that were initially 
identified by PAHL.58 Moreover, there is a positive linear relationship between earnings and the allocation 
of personal spending as well as exercise of control and power.59  These money management typologies 
have been subsequently expanded and divided into two categories: joint management systems where the 
couple operates as a single economic unit (e.g., female or male whole wage model and joint pooling); and 
independent management systems where they function as separate economic units (e.g., partial pooling 
and independent money management).60 
 Among joint management systems, the use of joint pooling is more common than female and 
male whole wage systems which have seen a growing decline in their use over the years. There is 
correspondingly a slight increase in the use of independent management systems such as partial pooling.61 
These choices of money management systems may be influenced by perceptions of commitment but they 
may equally be motivated by other factors such as the notion of equality that the couples subscribe to. 
VOGLER, for instance, observes that joint pooling is normally chosen by couples who perceive their 
relationships in terms of trust and sharing and seek to achieve equality of outcomes through equal control 
and access to household income.62 In these cases, the notion of equality could be translated by couples as 
sharing everything which, in practical terms, leads to joint pooling. Joint pooling is prevalent among 
married couples and parenting cohabitants. That choice may be due to the system being symbolic of 
¶EHLQJWRJHWKHU·DQGFRPSOLHVZLWKWKHSHUFHLYHGYLHZWKDWFRXSOHVVKDUH 
                                                     
58 PAHL, Money and Marriage, Macmillan Education/Basingstoke 1989. The four basic typologies of money 
management systems identified by Pahl are: wife-management system; allowance system; pooling system; and 
independent management system.  
59 PAHL, Household Spending, Personal Spending and the Control of Money, Journal of British Sociological 
Association 1990, 119; PAHL/VOGLER, Money, power and inequality within marriage, The Sociological Review 
1994, 263; VOGLER, Cohabiting couples: rethinking money in the household at the beginning of the twenty first 
century, The Sociological Review 2005, 1. 
60 VOGLER/BROCKMANN/WIGGINS, Intimate relationships and changing patterns of money management at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, The British Journal of Sociology 2006, 455. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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 On the other hand, childless and post-marital cohabitants and remarried couples generally prefer 
to use independent management systems such as partial pooling.63 The use of independent management 
systems may be due to a greater subscription to the principle of equality rather than a lack of 
commitment.64 Couples choosing independent management systems tend to define equality in slightly 
different terms. The system is often characterised by couples having their own but differential levels of 
earnings and/or assets65 DQGDGHVLUH IRUDXWRQRP\RYHURQH·VRZQHDUQings. For them, equality within 
the relationship means equal contributions towards joint expenses which may be framed as either joint 
expenses being divided equally between the couple or each partner being allocated responsibility for 
particular sets of expenses.66 This can in turn translate into sharing all the costs of acquiring and sharing a 
home through equal contributions either by splitting everything equally (formal equality) or, as in Stack, in 
SURSRUWLRQWRHDFKSDUWQHU·VHDUQLQJVVXEVWDQWLYHHTXDOity).67 
 'XH WR WKH GLYHUVLW\ RI FRXSOHV· UHODWLRQVKLSV ZKHWKHU PDUULHG RU FRKDELWLQJ ASHBY and 
BURGOYNE argue that their choice of money management system cannot simply be reduced to their 
notion of commitment alone.68 As discXVVHG DERYH D FRXSOH·V QRWLRQ RI HTXDOLW\ FRXSOHG ZLWK RWKHU
factors such as the level of their commitment and earnings, may influence their choice of money 
management system. BURGOYNE and SONNENBERG, for instance, observe that the holding of a joint 
account does not necessarily mean that the money in that account would be shared equally by the couple 
in practice: this may be due to principles such as earner entitlement69 and perceptions of ownership.70 
Likewise, holding separate finances (independent money management and even partial pooling) may not 
EH VXIILFLHQWO\ LQGLFDWLYH RI WKH FRXSOH·V ODFN RI FRPPLWPHQW DV WKHUH PD\ EH SUDJPDWLF DV ZHOO DV
ideological (equality and autonomy) reasons for doing so rather than a lack of commitment.71 
                                                     
63 These types of couples arguably may choose more individualised management systems in order to exercise a 
greater sense of equality and autonomy within their new relationships and/or avoid a repetition of negative 
experiences from their past relationships.  
64 SINGH/LINDSAY, Money in heterosexual relationships, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 1996, 
55; ELIZABETH, Managing money, managing coupledom: a critical examination of cohabitants' money management 
practices, The Sociological Review 2001, 389. See also VOGLER/BROCKMANN/WIGGINS, Managing money in new 
heterosexual forms of intimate relationships, The Journal of Socio-Economics 2008, 552 who found that parenting 
cohabitants are likely to operate joint pooling. Her study revealed that 59% of married couples and 52% of 
cohabitants used joint pooling. 
65 VOGLER/BROCKMANN/WIGGINS (Fn. 60) who found that couples with similar levels of income are more likely 
to use joint pooling while those with different income levels preferring partial pooling. 
66 ELIZABETH (Fn. 64) at 399.   
67 )RUDIXOOHUGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHSUREOHPVUHODWHGWRWKHQRWLRQRIHTXDOLW\DQGLWVUROHLQLQIOXHQFLQJFRXSOHV·FKRLFH
of money management systems, see WONG (Fn. 48). 
68 ASHBY/BURGOYNE, Separate financial entities? Beyond categories of money management, The Journal of Socio-
Economics (2008), 458. 
69 This principle relates to the non-earner feeling a sense of lack of entitlement to spend the money of the earner. 
1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJDFRXSOH·VVXEVFULSWLRQWRHTXDOLW\WKHUHPD\VWLOOEHLQHTXDOLWLHVRIDFFHVVWRDQGRUFRQWURORYHU
household income due to the non-earner feeling constrained in terms of spending and/or how and what amounts 
may be spent. See ELIZABETH (Fn. 64) at 398, 400-401. 
70 BURGOYNE/SONNENBERG, Financial Practices in Cohabiting Heterosexual Couples: A Perspective from 
Economic Psychology, in MILES/PROBERT (eds), Sharing Lives, Dividing Assets: An Inter-Disciplinary Study, 
London 2009, 89-108. 
71 Ibid. 
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 Based on these research findings and the significantly different levels of earnings of Ms Dowden 
and Mr Stack, their use of the partial pooling system may not necessarily be quite as unusual as made out 
by Lady Hale especially when one considers their differential income levels. Ms Dowden was earning 
nearly twice as much as Mr Stack. As BITTMAN et al SXW LW ¶0RQH\ WDONV LQPDUULDJH·72 This might be 
equally true of cohabitation! ELIZABETH similarly observes that women who earn as much or more than 
their partners are better placed to negotiate a position of greater power and in ensuring the use of a more 
favourable money management system.73   
 
 VI. Conclusion 
 While a more family-centric approach in these trust cases is to be welcomed in terms of enabling 
a wider range of contributions to be taken into consideration, the focus on context is not without 
problems. The use of presumptions within cases in the domestic context has helped to alleviate some, 
without eradicating all, of the evidential and doctrinal problems linked with the common intention 
requirement. Thus, in the joint names cases, Stack and Jones have provided for a presumption of equal 
sharing to arise which can only be rebutted in exceptional cases. This then calls for closer scrutiny of the 
FRQWH[W RI WKH SDUWLHV· relationship in order to ascertain whether the nature and surrounding 
circumstances of their relationship are sufficiently exceptional or unusual to rebut the presumption of 
equal sharing. In doing so, the cases seem to indicate some acknowledgement of the gender bias and 
unfairness faced by claimants (usually women) who have contributed substantially in indirect ways, 
whether financially or non-financially, to the acquisition and running of the property as the family home. 
Thus, the multi-factorial approach adopted by Lady Hale seeks in part to provide scope of these indirect 
contributions to be accounted for. 
 <HWWKHZD\LQZKLFK¶FRQWH[W·KDVEHHQFRQVWUXHGE\WKHMXGJHVKDVSURYHGHTXDOO\SUREOHPDWLF
and not exactly free from gender bias. This is because the judicial constructions given to the context of 
FRKDELWLQJFRXSOHV· UHODWLRQVKLSVVHHPWREHEDVHGRQDSDUWLFXODU W\SHRI UHODWLRQVKLS² the traditional 
¶PDOHEUHDGZLQQHUIHPDOHKRPHPDNHU·PDUULDJHPRGHO7RHQDEOHWKHSUHVXPSWLRQRIHTXDOVKDULQJ to 
DULVH WKH FRKDELWDWLRQ PXVW EH D ¶MRLQW HQWHUSULVH· WKDW PLPLFV PDUULDJH :KLOH WKHUH LV HYLGHQFH WKDW
VSRXVHV· DQG FRKDELWDQWV· SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH QRWLRQ RI FRPPLWPHQW PD\ QRW YDU\ JUHDWO\ MXGLFLDO
assumptions about what committed couples do and how they structure their relationships are still tied to 
this normative family model. There is, implicitly, a continued acceptance by the judiciary of a gendered 
division of labour within couple-based relationships but what should be less tolerated is the devaluation 
RIWKHJHQGHUHGXQSDLGZRUN7KXVZKLOHDZRPDQ·VXQSDLGFDUHJLYLQJZRUNLVWREHYDOXHGDQGJLYHQ
GXHZHLJKW DQG UHFRJQLWLRQ LQ WKHVHFDVHVVR WRRPXVW WKHPDQ·VSDLGZRUNDQGKLV FRQWLQXHG UROH DV
                                                     
72 BITTMAN et al (Fn. 55) at 209. 
73 ELIZABETH (Fn. 64) at 404. See also KENNEY, The Power of the Purse: Allocative systems and Inequality in 
Couple Households, Gender & Society 2006, 354. 
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breadwinner, albeit not necessarily as sole wage-earner. Within this normative framework, there is further 
an expectation of the continued compliance with the perceived view that committed couples share their 
money and assets. Any relationship that opts for a form of money management system other than joint 
pooling is then seen as deviant and, thus, exceptional! These notions of sharing lives are worrisome as 
both the allocation of roles and division of labour have become further entrenched in gender, reinforcing 
the principal role of women as unpaid caregivers and men as wage-earners. 
 
